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1 Introduction
Informative advertising, as opposed to persuasive advertising, is generally
perceived to promote competition (Bagwell, 2007). When a rm advertises,
consumers receive (at low costs) information about products, prices, etc.
This information is claimed to make the rms demand curve more price
elastic and competition more intense, resulting in lower prices and prots.1
In this paper, we challenge the robustness of the pro-competitive e¤ect of
informative advertising.
Butters (1977) o¤ers a rst formal analysis of informative advertising
in a multi-rm setting. Firms produce homogeneous products (at constant
unit costs) and compete in terms of prices and advertising. Advertising
is distributed randomly and informs consumers about a rms (products)
existence and price, resulting in the following three segments of consumers:
(i) uniformed consumers who receive no ads, and therefore do not buy any
of the products; (ii) captive consumers who receive an ad from only one rm
and buy this product provided that the price is below their reservation price;
and (iii) selective consumers who receive ads from more than one rm and
buy the product with the lowest price.2
Grossman and Shapiro (1984), henceforth GS, extend the work by But-
ters (1977) to horizontally di¤erentiated products using a Salop-type model.
In this setting advertising informs not just about existence and price, but
also about the rms location (or the products characteristics). Thus, se-
lective consumers do not necessarily choose the product with lowest price,
1It is also argued that informative advertising can faciliate entry, as it provides a means
through which a new entrant can inform potential buyers (Bagwell, 2007). However, sev-
eral papers have also looked at strategic incentives for the incumbent to use (informative)
advertising to deter (or accommodate) entry; see, e.g., Schmalensee (1983) and Ishigaki
(2000) for homogeneous products and Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Boyer and Moreaux
(1999) for di¤erentiated products. See also Brekke and Straume (2009) of an application
to pharmaceutical markets. In this paper we do not address the issue of advertising and
entry.
2Butters (1977) shows that rms adopt mixed strategies in any Nash equilibrium when
the number of rms is nite. However, in the limit case where the number of rms
becomes su¢ ciently large, rms charge prices above marginal costs but earn zero prots in
expectation (due to advertising costs). Thus, this is an equilibrium model of monopolistic
competition with informative advertising.
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but balance price di¤erences against travelling costs and buy the product
that yields the higher net utility. A striking result from their analysis is
that informative advertising triggers competition and leads to lower prices.3
In the same line GS show that prots may well decrease when advertising
becomes less costly. While a more e¢ cient advertising technology increases
rms incentives to advertise, more advertising triggers price competition.
The net e¤ect on prots depends on the strength of the direct cost e¤ect
relative to the strategic price e¤ect. GS show that the latter can dominate,
suggesting that rms may benet from advertising restrictions as they soften
price competition.
A crucial assumption in GS is that the demand from captive consumers
(who only know about one of the products) is perfectly price inelastic.4 The
reservation price is assumed to be su¢ ciently high, such that all captive con-
sumers buy (one unit of) the product they are informed about irrespective
of the price. Consequently, only demand from selective consumers (informed
about more than one product) is elastic with respect to prices. Thus, adver-
tising will by assumption lead to lower demand elasticity as it implies that
the competitive segment becomes larger.
We nd this assumption quite restrictive. In the current paper, we there-
fore revisit the GS model by allowing for demand from captive consumers to
be price elastic. In the rst part we replicate their model by using the famil-
iar Hotelling version (Tirole, 1988: 292-4). In the second part we generalise
this model by using general demand and advertising cost functions. In both
parts we rst derive the price equilibrium for given levels of information (ad-
vertising). Afterwards, we endogenise the degree of information by allowing
for this to be a choice variable for the rms, as in the informative advertising
models, and derive the symmetric price-advertising equilibrium.
In the Hotelling setting we show that the pro-competitive e¤ect of in-
formative advertising is in fact reversed once we allow for demand in the
3Using a random utility, non-localized competition model, Christou and Vettas (2008)
also nd that higher advertising levels are associated with lower prices.
4This assumption is indeed made by most papers, see, e.g., Butters (1977), Meurer and
Stahl (1994), Ishigaki (2000), Christou and Vettas (2008), Simbanegavi (2009). See also
Tirole (1988: 292-4).
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monopoly segment to respond to prices. Informative advertising now leads
to higher prices. The reason is that partially informed consumers have (on
average) higher transport (mismatch) costs, and therefore are more price re-
sponsive than fully informed consumers. We also show that a more costly
advertising technology reduces prices and prots, implying that rms never
benet from advertising restrictions. Thus, the pro-competitive e¤ect of in-
formative advertising is highly sensitive to the extreme assumption of price
inelastic demand in the monopoly segment; an assumption that might be
unreasonable considering markets for di¤erentiated products.
In a generalised version of the basic model, where we abstract from the
Hotelling framework, we derive general conditions for the competitive e¤ect
of informative advertising to prevail. A main result is that the competitive
e¤ect depends on the nature of competition and the relative price elasticities
of the monopoly and the competitive demand segments created by infor-
mative advertising. More precisely, we show that informative advertising
leads to lower (higher) prices if and only if prices are strategic complements
and partially informed consumers are less (more) price elastic than the fully
informed consumers. These results conrm our ndings in the specialised
Hotelling version of the informative advertising model.
Our paper is not the rst to report a positive relationship between in-
formative advertising and prices. This relationship is present in Soberman
(2004), Brekke and Kuhn (2006) and Hamilton (2009) who all relax the as-
sumption of perfect price inelasticity in the monopoly demand segment.5
The main contributions of the current paper is to investigate the competitive
e¤ects of informative advertising in great detail and derive more general con-
ditions for the competitive e¤ects. First, we consider the case of exogenous
and potentially asymmetric information levels. Here we show that more con-
sumers informed about the own product a¤ects own pricing only through the
price response by the rival (strategic complements), while more consumers
5Soberman (2004) is a short note that only focuses on the e¤ect on prices, ignoring
e¤ects on demand and prots. Brekke and Kuhn (2006) is an application to the pharma-
ceutical market, and is not focusing on competitive e¤ects in general. Hamilton (2009)
is mainly concerned with the welfare properties, i.e., whether informative advertising is
over- or undersupplied, though competitive e¤ects are mentioned.
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informed about the rival product have a direct e¤ect on own pricing (lower
prices to mitigate loss in market shares). Moreover, we show that the rm
with more informed consumers sets a lower (higher) price if demand in the
monopoly segment is more (less) price elastic than the demand in the com-
petitive segment. However, irrespective of the price e¤ects, the rm with
more informed consumers always obtains a higher prot.
Second, we derive the comparative statics with respect to advertising
technology, product di¤erentiation and consumersvaluation of the products
(reservation price). Higher consumer valuation is always benecial for the
rms when the monopoly demand segment is responding to prices. A higher
degree of product di¤erentiation leads to higher prices, but the e¤ects on
advertising and prots depends on whether or not the partially informed
consumers are price sensitive or not. Similarly, a more e¢ cient advertising
technology always boosts advertising incentives, but the e¤ects on prices and
prots depend again on the price responsiveness in the monopoly demand
segment.
Finally, we propose a more general demand system in order to investigate
more general conditions for the existence of the pro-competitive e¤ect of
informative advertising. Here we show that the e¤ect depends on the nature
of competition and the relative price elasticities of the two segments created
by informative advertising, as explained above.
Other related papers include the following. Simbanegavi (2009) uses a
duopoly version of the Salop model to study the incentives for semicollusion
(on either price or advertising). This paper, too, recognises that consumers
in the monopoly segment may be responsive to prices, but in the equilibrium
analysis attention is restricted to the case with price inelastic demand from
captive consumers. Christou and Vettas (2008) address the competitive ef-
fects of informative advertising but on the basis of a very di¤erent modelling
approach. They use a random utility model, where each consumers gross
valuation of a product is randomly drawn from some distribution and ob-
served only after the receipt of an ad. They study the equilibrium properties
both under non-localized and localized (GS model) competition and show
the correspondence between the two models. A main nding is that pure
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strategy equilibrium might fail to exists as rms may nd it protable to
deviate to a high price serving only captive consumers. This feature is also
present in our paper, and we carefully derive the existence condition, which
is not done in the previous studies. Christou and Vettas (2008) show that
when the number of rms increases, advertising becomes lower, while the
e¤ect on prices is ambiguous. Thus, there might be a positive relationship
between advertising and prices as the number of rms increases, but not for a
given number of rms. In Meurer and Stahl (1994) consumers observe prices
while rms decide whether to inform them about product characteristics. In
Bester and Petrakis (1995) consumers know that two rms exists and the
price of the product in their region (local market), but only learn the price
from the other rm once they have received an ad. However, none of these
studies have scrutinized the common, but surely not innocent, assumption
of perfectly price inelastic demand in the monopoly segment. The present
paper seeks to shed more light on this issue.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we present the
Hotelling duopoly version of the GS model. In section 3 we apply general de-
mand (and advertising cost) functions in the duopoly framework. In section
4 we conclude the paper.
2 A Hotelling Duopoly Model
We start by replicating the duopoly version of Grossman and Shapiro (1984),
henceforth GS, as presented in Tirole (1988: 292-4). Consider a market with
two rms, indexed by i = 1; 2, o¤ering one product each at price pi. The rms
(or products) are located at either end of the unit interval S = [0; 1] ; where
z1 = 0 and z2 = 1 are the locations of rm (product) 1 and 2, respectively.
In this market there is a uniform distribution of consumers on the interval
S with mass 1. Each consumer demands one unit of either product or no
product at all. The utility to an arbitrary consumer x 2 S of consuming
product i is given by
ui = v   pi   t jx  zij ; (1)
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where v is the gross consumption benet (or reservation price), and t is the
travelling cost per unit distance between the consumers location x and the
location of product (or rm) i.
Consumers are ex ante uninformed about the products available in the
market. To generate demand, each rm must advertise its product to the
consumers.6 We let ai 2 (0; 1) be the advertising level of product i. Adver-
tising is assumed to contain true information about product characteristics
(location) and price. In our model and similar to GS and Butters (1977), ai is
equivalent to the share of consumers who obtain information about product
i:
Demand of rm i, with potential size ai, can then be decomposed into two
parts: (i) a fraction 1 aj of captive consumers who are informed only about
product i; and (ii) a fraction aj of selective consumers who are informed
about both products. The residual fraction (1  ai) (1  aj) of consumers
remain uninformed and do not demand either product. We refer to the rst
segment as the monopoly segment (of rm i), and the second segment as the
competitive segment (for both rms).
Consumers informed about both products trade o¤ relative prices and
distances, and choose the product that provides the higher net utility. The
consumer who is exactly indi¤erent between product 1 and 2, i.e., for whom
u1 (bx) = u2 (bx), is located at
bx =
8><>:
1 if p1  p2   t
1
2
  p1 p2
2t
if p1 2 (p2   t; p2 + t)
0 if p1  p2 + t
: (2)
All (fully informed) consumers to the left of bx demand product 1, while
the residual fraction demand product 2. In the subsequent analysis, we
assume existence of a competitive segment, which requires the following two
conditions to be fullled (in equilibrium): (i) bx 2 (0; 1) , t > jp1   p2j ;
and (ii) ui (bx) > 0 , v   t2 > p1+p22 . Thus, the transport cost (t) must be
su¢ ciently high relative to the price di¤erence, and the average net benet
6As in GS we abstract from consumer search for products.
7
cannot be lower than the average price level. Below we report the exact
conditions in each part of the analysis.
Consumers only informed about product i, demand this product provided
that consumption yields non-negative utility. The consumer who is exactly
indi¤erent between buying or not buying product i, i.e. for whom, ui (exi) = 0
is located at:
exi =
8><>:
1  zi if pi  v   tv pi
t
  zi
 if pi 2 (v   t; v)
zi   0 if pi  v
: (3)
Thus, if the reservation price (transport cost) is su¢ ciently high (low) rel-
ative to the price, then all partially informed consumers will buy product
i. However, if the gross surplus for the most distant consumer, v   t; is
su¢ ciently low, then consumers will trade-o¤ the benet against the costs,
and some (those located farthest away from the rm) decide not to buy
the product. In the extreme case of a very low v, no consumer is willing
to buy the product, but this case is ruled out by the assumption of a com-
petitive segment. Notably, GS focus solely on the rst case with a perfectly
price inelastic monopoly demand segment. In the following, we will allow for
partially informed consumers to respond to price.
The demand for product 1 and 2 can now be written as:
D1 =
Z ex1
0
a1 (1  a2) ds+
Z bx
0
a1a2ds = a1 (1  a2) ex1 + a1a2bx; (4)
D2 =
Z 1
ex2 a2 (1  a1) ds+
Z 1
bx a1a2ds = a2 (1  a1) (1  ex2) + a1a2 (1  bx) :
(5)
where the rst term (in both equations) is the demand from partially in-
formed consumers, corresponding to the rms monopoly segment, whereas
the second term is the competitive segment shared by the rms. Notice that
the assumption of a competitive segment implies that ex2 < bx < ex1.
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2.1 Price equilibrium with exogenous information
Let us start by assuming that the degree of product information among
consumers is exogenous, i.e., ai 2 (0; 1), i = 1; 2. The gross prot to rm i
is given by
Vi = (pi   c)Di; (6)
where c is a constant marginal production cost. Without loss of generality, we
let c = 0 in the following analysis. The rms set price in order to maximise
(gross) prots. Prices are set simultaneously and independently.
Price inelastic monopoly demand
Maximising (6) with respect to price, assuming that v   t  pi, and
solving the corresponding set of rst-order conditions, yields the following
price equilibrium:7
pAi = t

4ai + 2aj   3aiaj
3aiaj

; i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j: (7)
Inserting (7) into (2), (4) and (6), we obtain
bxA = 1
2
  a1   a2
3a1a2
; (8)
DAi =
4ai + 2aj   3aiaj
6
; (9)
V Ai = t
(4ai + 2aj   3aiaj)2
18aiaj
: (10)
The price equilibrium dened by (7) constitutes an equilibrium if and only
if the following assumptions are satised:8
exAi = 1 , v > t4ai + 2aj3aiaj

: (11)
7The second order conditions are always fullled. Furthermore, the Jacobian is strictly
positive, i.e., J = 34t2 a
2
i a
2
j > 0, so we have a unique and stable equilibrium.
8It is readily checked that the conditions in (12) and (11) also guarantee ui
 bxA > 0:
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bxA 2 (0; 1), ai   ajaiaj
 < 32 ; (12)
In addition, we need to ensure that each rm cannot protably deviate by
charging such a high price that only the monopoly segment is served. The
maximum price rm i can charge is pDi = v t (with a covered market), which
yields the following deviation prots: V Di = (v   t) ai (1  aj). Thus, exis-
tence of the price equilibrium in (7) requires that V Ai
 
pAi ; p
A
i
  V Di  pDi ; pAj ,
which is always true if
v  t
 
1 +
(4ai + 2aj   3aiaj)2
18a2i aj (1  aj)
!
: (13)
Assuming the restrictions in (11)-(13) to hold, we can now investigate the
e¤ect of information on the equilibrium outcomes.
The impact of more consumers informed of own product (ai) and rival
product (aj) on equilibrium outcomes is obtained by taking the partial deriv-
atives of (7)-(10), yielding the following results:
Proposition 1 In a Hotelling duopoly model with imperfect information and
a price inelastic monopoly segment, more information regarding own product
(ai) and rival product (aj) has the following e¤ects:
@pAi
@ai
< 0;
@pAi
@aj
< 0;
@bxA
@a1
< 0;
@bxA
@a2
> 0;
@DAi
@ai
> 0;
@DAi
@aj
? 0; @V
A
i
@ai
? 0; @V
A
i
@aj
< 0:
A proof is provided in the Appendix.
Thus, more information about either of the products leads to lower equi-
librium prices. In the limit case ai = aj = 1, then pAi = t, the standard
outcome under full information (with c = 0). A greater number of informed
consumers implies a larger competitive segment, which in turn triggers price
competition. This result is consistent with GS. Here, we show that the
pro-competitive e¤ect is robust to asymmetric levels of product information
(within the boundaries dened above).
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Considering demand, information has a direct e¤ect and an indirect e¤ect
via changes in relative prices. A larger share of consumers informed about
product i increases both the monopoly segment (of rm i) and the compet-
itive segment (shared by the rms). The market share in the competitive
segment is negatively a¤ected by own information. However, the direct ef-
fect dominates, yielding a positive net demand e¤ect of own information. A
larger share of consumers informed about the rival product has a negative
direct demand e¤ect, as consumers are shifted from rm is monopoly seg-
ment to the competitive segment. However, since pi decreases in aj by more
than pj, rm i captures a larger market share in the competitive segment,
resulting in an ambiguous net demand e¤ect.
Finally, the e¤ect of consumer information about the own product on
(gross) prot is ambiguous: ai; reduces price but increases demand. However,
more information about the rival product reduces own prots: a higher aj
reduces price and potentially demand of rm i.
A comparison across rms yields
pAi   pAj =
2t (ai   aj)
3aiaj
; DAi  DAj =
ai   aj
3
V Ai   V Aj =
2t (ai + aj   aiaj) (ai   aj)
3aiaj
;
from which we obtain the following.
Proposition 2 In a Hotelling duopoly model with imperfect product infor-
mation and a price inelastic monopoly segment, the rm with more (less)
informed consumers has higher (lower) price, demand and prot, i.e.,
pAi > () pAj ; DAi > ()DAj and V Ai > ()V Aj if ai > () aj:
Thus, for the rm with more informed consumers price, demand and gross
prot are larger. At a rst glance, this might seem surprising, since prices are
decreasing in the degree of consumer information. However, as the rm with
more informed consumers has a larger monopoly segment, where demand is
price inelastic, it can sustain a higher (relative) price.
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Concerning demand, there are o¤setting e¤ects. The rm with more
informed consumers enjoys a larger monopoly segment, but a lower market
share in the competitive segment owing to the higher price. However, the
increase in the monopoly segment always dominates the loss of competitive
market share, implying that the rm with more informed consumers has a
higher demand. Finally, since both price and demand is larger for the rm
with more informed consumers, it also enjoys a greater gross prot.
Price elastic monopoly demand
Maximising (6), assuming that v   t < pi < v; and solving the corre-
sponding set of rst-order conditions, yields the following price equilibrium:9
pBi =
v (8  4ai   6aj + 2aiaj) + taj (4  ai)
16  8ai   8aj + 3aiaj ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (14)
Inserting (14) into (2)-(6), we get the following equilibrium outcomes
bxB = 1
2
+
(2t  v) (a1   a2)
t (16  8a1   8a2 + 3a1a2) ; (15)
exBi = v (2  ai) (4  aj)  taj (4  ai)t (16  8ai   8aj + 3aiaj)   zi
 ; (16)
DBi =
ai (2  aj)
2t
  pBi  ; (17)
V Bi =
ai (2  aj)
2t
  pBi 2 : (18)
9The second order conditions are always fullled. Furthermore, the Jacobian is strictly
positive, i.e., J = aiaj(16 8ai 8aj+3aiaj)4t2 > 0, so we have a unique and stable equilibrium.
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The price equilibrium, dened by (14), requires the following assumptions to
be satised:10 exBi < 1 , v < 2t; (19)
bxB 2 (0; 1) , t >  2 (2t  v) (ai   aj)16  8ai   8aj + 3aiaj
 ; (20)
u
 bxB > 0 , v > t
2
(4  ai) (4  aj)
8  3ai   3aj + aiaj 2

t;
3t
2

: (21)
The impact of more consumers informed of own product (ai) and rival
product (aj) on the equilibrium outcomes is found by taking the partial
derivatives of (14)-(18), yielding the following result:
Proposition 3 In a Hotelling duopoly model with imperfect product infor-
mation and a price elastic monopoly segment, more information about own
product (ai) and rival product (aj) have the following e¤ects:
@pBi
@ai
> 0;
@pBi
@aj
> 0;
@bxB
@a1
> 0;
@bxB
@a2
< 0;
@exBi
@ai
< 0;
@exBi
@ai
< 0;
@DBi
@ai
> 0;
@DBi
@aj
< 0;
@V Bi
@ai
> 0;
@V Bi
@aj
< 0:
A proof is provided in the Appendix.
In contrast to the previous case (Proposition 1), we now nd that equilib-
rium prices increase in the number of consumers being informed about the
own or rival product. This result is not consistent with the pro-competitive
nding by GS. The reason is that the marginal consumer informed about
only one product is not just price responsive, but, in fact, more price respon-
sive than the marginal consumer informed about both products. A marginal
increase in price reduces demand in the monopoly segment with  1=t, while
10In this case, we do not need further conditions for existence. Consider a downward
deviation from the equilibrium price, where rm 1 sets a low price pD1 such that bx = 1,
i.e. it claims the full competitive segment when p2 = pB2 : Here, p
D
1  pB2   t  v   t must
hold, the rst inequality being implied by bx = 1; the second by (21). But then, exD1 = 1;
so that V1
 
pD1 ; p
B
2

= pD1 a1: Noting that p
D
1 = p
B
2   t is the deviation price attaining the
highest level of prot, it is readily veried now that pD1  0, v  2t; which is true from
(20). But then, V1
 
pD1 ; p
B
2
  0 < V1  pB1 ; pB2  ; implying a deviation is never protable.
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in the competitive segment the e¤ect is  1=2t.11 The intuition is that con-
sumers informed about only one product face on average higher transport
costs (lower utility) than consumers informed about both products.
A greater number of consumers informed about the own product increases
the size of both the competitive and monopoly segment. The indirect e¤ects
via prices are o¤setting: The rm gains market share in the competitive seg-
ment, as the rival raises price by more than the rm itself. But the price
increase leads to a loss of consumers in the monopoly segment. The net e¤ect
on demand, however, of own information is always positive. In contrast, de-
mand falls as more consumers become informed about the rival product. The
reason is that as aj increases, consumers are shifted from rm is monopoly
segment to the competitive segment. The indirect e¤ects are also negative:
(i) demand in the monopoly segment drops due to higher prices; and (ii)
the competitive segment market share is reduced due to changes in relative
prices.
Finally, a greater number of consumers informed about the own product
has a positive e¤ect on own prots since both price and demand increase. The
e¤ect of more consumers being informed about the rival product is negative:
although the own price can be increased, this is more than o¤set by the loss
in demand.
Comparing the equilibrium outcomes, we obtain
pBi   pBj =
2 (aj   ai) (2t  v)
16  8ai   8aj + 3aiaj ;
DBi  DBj =
(ai   aj) (8v   4vai   4vaj + taiaj + vaiaj)
t (16  8ai   8aj + 3aiaj) ;
V Bi   V Bi =
(ai   aj) (2v2 (2  ai   aj) + aiajt (2v   t))
t (16  8ai   8aj + 3aiaj) :
We can now report the following results:
Proposition 4 In a Hotelling duopoly model with imperfect information and
11Alternatively, we can calculate the elasticities in the two segments. It is readily veried
that j"exi j > j"bxi j , v  t < pj , which is always true for the case of price elastic monopoly
demand.
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a price elastic monopoly segment, the rm with more (less) informed con-
sumers has lower (higher) prices, but higher (lower) demand and prot, i.e.,
pBi < () pBj ; DBi > ()DBi and V Bi > ()V Bj if ai > () aj:
Proof. The price ranking follows from the equilibrium condition (19), i.e.,
2t > v, whereas the prot ranking follows from the equilibrium condition
(21), i.e., v > t
2
(4 ai)(4 aj)
8 3ai 3aj+aiaj 2
 
t; 3t
2

:
In contrast to the previous case (Proposition 2), we now nd that the rm
with more informed consumers has a lower price. The reason is that demand
is more price elastic in the monopoly than in the competitive segment, as
explained above. As the rm with a larger fraction of informed consumers
has a relatively larger monopoly segment, it charges a lower price.
As in the previous case, demand is higher for the rm with more informed
consumers. If ai > aj, rm i has a larger monopoly segment than rm j.
Furthermore, as rm i charges a relatively lower price, it attracts more con-
sumers both within the monopoly and the competitive segment. All of these
e¤ects contribute unambiguously towards a higher demand. Finally, gross
prot is also higher for the rm with more informed consumers. Although
the rm charges a lower price, the increase in demand is always dominating.
2.2 Advertising and price competition
Let us now endogenise the degree of product information by allowing the
rms to advertise. Employing the standard informative advertising model,
as introduced by Butters (1977) and GS, we denote by C (ai; k) the cost of
reaching with ads a fraction ai of consumers. Advertising cost is assumed to
be increasing and strictly convex in ai.12 To facilitate explicit solutions, we
follow Tirole (1988) by assuming a quadratic function, i.e., C (ai; k) = ka2i =2,
where k > 0 is an advertising cost parameter. Firm is prot function can
now be written as:
i = pi Di   k
2
a2i : (22)
12For details about the advertising technology, see Grossman and Shapiro (1984).
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As in GS and Tirole (1988), the rms set prices and advertising simulta-
neously and independently in order to maximise prots.
Price inelastic monopoly demand
Maximising (22) with respect to price and advertising, assuming that
v   t  pi, and solving the corresponding set of rst-order conditions yields
the following symmetric equilibrium:
pC = t

2  aC
aC

=
p
2kt; (23)
aC =
2pC
2k + pC
=
2
1 +
p
2k=t
; (24)
which is identical to the one reported in Tirole (1988: 292-4). The following
two assumptions ensure that (23) and (24) constitute an equilibrium:
exC = 1 , v  t+p2kt; (25)
aC  1, k  t=2: (26)
Existence of the price-advertising equilibrium requires that (13) is satised
for the equilibrium values ai = aj = aC . Inserting (24) into (13), we get the
following condition
v  t+ 2kp
2k=t  1 : (27)
It can easily be shown that the RHS of (25) always is lower than the RHS of
(27) for all k  t=2:
Assuming (25)-(27) to hold, we can analyse the equilibrium characteris-
tics. First, we observe that @pC=@aC < 0, whereas @aC=@pC > 0: Hence,
greater levels of advertising stimulate price competition (i.e. lower prices)
and higher prices stimulate advertising competition (i.e. higher levels of ad-
vertising). We also see that price and advertising levels are increasing in
product di¤erentiation (t), whereas a more costly advertising technology (k)
induces less advertising but higher prices. In the limit case, where k = t=2,
so that ac = 1, we get the full information outcome, with pC = t:
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Inserting (23) and (24) into (22), we obtain the rmsequilibrium prot:
C =
2k
1 +
p
2k=t
2 : (28)
As expected, prot increases in the degree of product di¤erentiation, reect-
ing higher prices and a greater level of demand due to additional advertising.
More surprisingly, however, prot also increases in the costliness of advertis-
ing, as measured by k. As rms engage in less advertising, the corresponding
decrease in price competition overcompensates the direct tendency towards
higher advertising costs. This is precisely the result found by GS and Tirole
(1988). We can summarise in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 The following holds for a Hotelling duopoly model with in-
formative advertising and a price inelastic monopoly segment:
(i) a higher advertising cost (k), lowers advertising, increases prices, and
increases prots,
(ii) more product di¤erentiation (t), increases prices, advertising and
prots.
Price elastic monopoly segment
Maximising (22) with respect to price and advertising, assuming v   t <
pi, the symmetric price-advertising equilibrium is implicitly dened by the
following two equations:13 ;14
Zp : = 2 (1  a) v + at  (4  3a) p = 0; (29)
Za : = (2  a) p2   2akt = 0: (30)
From this we can express equilibrium price and advertising as
13We obtain the expression in (30) when substituting 2 (1  a) v + at = (4  3a) p into
the rst-order condition with respect to a: p [2 (1  a) (v   p) + at]  2akt = 0; and rear-
ranging.
14We show in the Proof of Proposition 6 that the Jacobian satises JD > 0; which
implies a unique and stable equilbrium.
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pD =
2v
 
1  aD+ taD
4  3aD ; (31)
aD =
2
 
pD
2
2kt+ (pD)2
: (32)
For (29)-(30) to dene an equilibrium, we need to assume15
exi 2 1
2
; 1

, v 2 vD; 2t ; with vD = t  4  aD
2 (2  aD) 2

t;
3
2
t

; (33)
aD  1,  pD2  2kt: (34)
Assuming the conditions (33)-(34) to hold, we can investigate the equi-
librium characteristics. First, we observe that
@pD
@aD
=
2 (2t  v)
(4  3aC)2 > 0 and
@aD
@pD
=
8pDkt 
2kt+ (pD)2
2 > 0:
Thus, in contrast to the previous case, advertising relaxes price competition,
whereas higher prices continue to promote advertising competition. We also
see that if aD ! 1, then pD ! t.
Inserting (31) and (32) into (22), we obtain the following equilibrium
prot:
D =
aD
 
2  aD
4t
  pD2 : (35)
We can now analyse the properties of the price-advertising equilibrium
under price elastic demand in the monopoly segment. By applying Cramers
rule to the system (29) and (30), and di¤erentiating (35), we obtain the
following result:
Proposition 6 In a Hotelling model with informative advertising and a
price elastic monopoly demand segment,
(i) a higher advertising cost (k) lowers advertising, prices, and prots;
15Note that exi > 12 is equivalent to u   12 > 0. Note also that the condition in (34) is
only implicit. As is readily veried this is satised if k is su¢ ciently large relative to v
and t:
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(ii) more product di¤erentiation (t) increases prices, and a¤ects advertis-
ing and prots in the same yet ambiguous direction;
(iii) a greater gross willingness to pay (v), increases advertising, prices,
and prots.
A proof is provided in the Appendix.
Similar to the previous case (Proposition 5), a higher advertising cost
(k) has a negative impact on advertising. However, a higher advertising
cost now leads to lower prices. A change in k has only an indirect e¤ect
on prices via advertising. As shown above, advertising and prices are now
positively correlated. The reason is that at lower advertising levels, the
monopoly segment is relatively larger than the competitive segment. Since
price elasticity is higher in the monopoly segment, prices are increasing with
advertising. The impact on prots of a higher advertising cost is then also
negative due to lower prices and less advertising (demand).
As expected, product di¤erentiation (t) has a positive impact on prices.
The e¤ect on advertising, however, is ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher
t increases price and therefore renders advertising more attractive. On the
other hand, (for a given price) a higher t depresses demand in the monopoly
segment ex = (v   p) =t and, thereby, renders advertising less attractive. The
same two o¤setting forces - higher price but lower demand in the monopoly
segment - apply to the impact of t on prot. As it turns out product di¤er-
entiation increases prot if and only if it also boosts advertising. We show
in the proof that this is the case if and only if a < 2v= (2v + t) ; i.e. if
and only if advertising levels are su¢ ciently low. In this case the monopoly
segment is small relative to the competitive segment, which clearly implies
that the reduction of demand within the monopoly segment is dominated
by the boost of prices. However, if the monopolistic segment is su¢ ciently
large, product di¤erentiation tends to stie advertising and prots. This
counter-intuitive nding stands again in contrast to the case of a perfectly
price-inelastic monopolistic segment.
Finally, the impact of a higher gross willingness-to-pay is straightforward.
A higher gross willingness to pay for the product, v, allows the rms to charge
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a higher price and to engage in more advertising. Both activities contribute
towards a higher prot.
3 A generalised model
In this section we seek to establish a more general condition for informative
advertising to be pro-competitive (or otherwise). Let rm is demand in the
monopoly and competitive segments be given by the continuous and twice
di¤erentiable functions xi (pi) and yi (pi; pj) with the following properties:
Assumption 1: @xi
@pi
< 0; @yi
@pi
< 0; @
2xi
@p2i
 0; @2yi
@p2i
 0:
Assumption 2:
@yi@pi  >  @yi@pj  ; @2yi@p2i  >  @2yi@pj@pi  :
Assumption 1 ensures prot maximum with respect to prices and As-
sumption 2 stability and uniqueness for the price equilibrium.
Firm is demand function is given by:
Di = ai (1  aj)xi (pi) + aiajyi (pi; pj) ; (36)
and has the following properties:
@Di
@pi
= ai (1  aj) @xi
@pi
+ aiaj
@yi
@pi
< 0;
@Di
@pj
= aiaj
@yi
@pj
;
@Di
@ai
= (1  aj)xi (pi) + ajyi (pi; pj) > 0;
@Di
@aj
=  ai [xi (pi)  yi (pi; pj)] < 0:
If own price pi is raised this reduces own demand in both the monopoly
and the competitive segment. If products are substitutes then @yi
@pj
> 0;
i.e. a higher price of the rival product pj increases own market share in
the competitive segment. More consumers informed being informed about
the own product (ai) increase both the monopoly and the competitive seg-
ments. Finally, more consumers informed about the rival product (aj) lower
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own demand because demand tends to shift from the monopoly segment to
the competitive segment, where rm i faces a lower demand. Given that
the underlying market demand functions are identical for the monopoly and
competitive segments, it must necessarily be true that the rm captures at
least as many consumers in the monopoly segment, as in the competitive
segment, i.e. xi (pi)  yi (pi; pj) must be true.
3.1 Price equilibrium with exogenous information
Let us now derive the equilibrium when rms set prices simultaneously and
independently taking the degree of product information as exogenously given.
In this case, each rm i chooses the price that maximises the gross prot
function
Vi = (pi   c)Di; (37)
where c is a constant marginal cost parameter assumed to be identical across
rms. The prot-maximising price of rm i is dened by the following rst-
order condition16
@Vi
@pi
= (1  aj)

xi + (pi   c) @xi
@pi

+aj

yi + (pi   c) @yi
@pi

= 0; i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i:
(38)
The prot-maximising price is balancing the marginal protability from the
monopoly (rst-term) and the competitive (second-term) segments.17
Equation (38) implicitly denes a best-response function pi (pj). By dif-
16The second-order condition requires that
@2Vi
@p2i
= (1  aj)

2
@xi
@pi
+ (pi   c) @
2xi
@p2i

+ aj

2
@yi
@pi
+ (pi   c) @
2yi
@p2i

< 0;
which is satised by Assumption 1.
17Obviously, rm i could increase its prot by charging di¤erent prices to consumers in
the monopoly and the competitive segment. However, we do not allow for price discrimi-
nation. As in other models of non-targetted advertising, uniform pricing is justied when
rms are unable to observe individual consumersinformation.
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ferentiation, using the implicit-function rule, we obtain:
dpi
dpj
=  
@2Vi
@pj@pi
@2Vi
@p2i
=  
aj

@yi
@pj
+ (pi   c) @2yi@pj@pi

@2Vi
@p2i
: (39)
Since the denominator is negative, the sign depends on the numerator. If the
numerator is negative, then dpi
dpj
> 0 and prices are strategic complements.
Observe from (39) that all strategic interaction is going through the compet-
itive segment. If aj = 0, there is no strategic relationship in prices, and the
rms set price as local monopolists.
The set of rst-order conditions given by (38) implicitly denes the Nash-
equilibrium in prices; p1 (a1; a2) and p

2 (a1; a2). Using the (own-price) elas-
ticities
"xi :=
@xi
@pi
pi
xi
and "yi :=
@yi
@pi
pi
yi
;
we can write the price equilibrium condition as:
(1  aj) @xi
@pi

1
"xi
+
pi   c
pi

+ aj
@yi
@pi

1
"yi
+
pi   c
pi

= 0; (40)
The price equilibrium is unique and stable if the Jacobian is strictly positive,
i.e., if
J =
@2Vi
@p2i
@2Vj
@p2j
  @
2Vi
@pj@pi
@2Vj
@pi@pj
> 0
It is readily veried that Assumption 3 is su¢ cient to ensure that J > 0.18
From (40) we see that the equilibrium prices are determined by the rela-
tive sizes (aj; 1  aj) and price elasticities ("xi ; "yi) of the competitive and the
monopolistic segment. Dene pmi as the price that would maximise prots in
18As in the Hotelling model, rms might have incentives to deviate, so that a pure
strategy equilibrium might fail to exist. It can be shown that deviation does not arise
if the di¤erence between the elasticities "xi and "yi is not too large. Further details are
available from the authors on request.
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the monopoly segment19
xi (p
m
i ) + (p
m
i   c)
@xi (p
m
i )
@pi
= 0,  p
m
i   c
pmi
=
1
"xi
; (41)
and pci as the equilibrium price for the competitive segment
yi
 
pci ; p
c
j

+ (pci   c)
@yi
 
pci ; p
c
j

@pi
= 0,  p
c
i   c
pci
=
1
"yi
: (42)
Obviously, if aj ! 0, then pi ! pmi , and if aj ! 1, then pi ! pci . Using the
denitions in (41)-(42), we can establish the following result:
Proposition 7 The price equilibrium dened by (40) implies either of three
possibilities: (i) If "xi = "yi = const; then
 p

i   c
pi
=
1
"xi
=
1
"yi
and pi = p
m
i = p
c
i :
(ii) If demand in the monopoly segment is less price elastic than in the
competitive segment, i.e., if 0 > "xi jpi > "yi jpi , then
1
"xi
<  p

i   c
pi
<
1
"yi
and pci < p

i < p
m
i .
(iii) If demand in the monopoly segment is more price elastic than in the
competitive segment, i.e., if 0 > "yi jpi > "xi jpi , then
1
"yi
<  p

i   c
pi
<
1
"xi
and pmi < p

i < p
c
i :
Proof. Recalling that @xi
@pi
 0 and @yi
@pi
< 0, it follows that (40) implies
either of three cases: (i) 1
"xi
=  pi c
pi
= 1
"yi
; (ii) 1
"xi
<  pi c
pi
< 1
"yi
; or (iii)
1
"yi
<  pi c
pi
< 1
"xi
: The outer (in-)equalities in these three expressions imply
and are implied by the three cases given in the Proposition.
19Note that pmi is not equivalent to the monopoly price. Monopoly pricing is dened
by the set of prices
 
pMi ; p
M
j

:= argmax fVi (pi; pj) + Vj (pi; pj)g : It is easily veried that
monopoly prices always exceed the equilibrium prices dened by (40).
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Thus, the price e¤ect of more information (or informative advertising)
is not clear-cut as in GS (1984).20 In fact, if demand in the competitive
segment is less price elastic than demand in the monopoly segment, then a
larger fraction of fully informed consumers will result in higher prices. We
showed in section 2.1 that this was indeed the case in the Hotelling duopoly
model with imperfect information and price elastic demand in the monopoly
segment.
The impact of information / advertising
Let us analyse the impact of more consumer information on price com-
petition. Performing comparative statics on the set of rst-order conditions
in (38) we obtain:21
dpi
dai
=
1
J
@2Vj
@ai@pj
@2Vi
@pj@pi
; (43)
dpi
daj
=   1
J
@2Vi
@aj@pi
@2Vj
@p2j
; (44)
where @
2Vi
@pj@pi
> 0 if and only if prices are strategic complements, and where
@2Vi
@aj@pi
=  

xi + (pi   c) @xi
@pi

+

yi + (pi   c) @yi
@pi

:
Using (38), we get
@2Vi
@aj@pi
=   1
aj

xi + (pi   c) @xi
@pi

20Note that the model by GS and, similarly, our model with a price inlastic
monopoly segment is, indeed, a special case, for which condition (40) reads (1  aj) xipi +
aj
@yi
@pi
h
1
"yi
+
pi c
pi
i
= 0: This obviously implies  pi cpi <
1
"yi
and, thus, pi > p
c
i :
21Generally, we have that:
dpi
dai
=   1
J

@2Vi
@ai@pi
@2Vi
@pj@pi
@2Vj
@ai@pj
@2Vj
@p2j
 and dp

i
daj
=   1
J

@2Vi
@aj@pi
@2Vi
@pj@pi
@2Vj
@aj@pj
@2Vj
@p2j

However, since @2Vi=@ai@pi = @2Vj=@aj@pj = 0, the comparative statics simplify to
those reported in (43)-(44).
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Using the elasticity, it follows that
@2Vi
@aj@pi
> (<) 0, 1
"xi
> (<)  pi   c
pi
:
We can thus conclude the following.
Proposition 8 (i) Information about the own product reduces (increases)
own price (through a strategic e¤ect) if prices are strategic complements and
the monopolistic segment is less (more) price elastic than the competitive
segment. The opposite applies if prices are strategic substitutes.
(ii) Information about the rival product reduces (increases) own price
(through a direct e¤ect) if and only if the monopolistic segment is less (more)
price elastic than the competitive segment.
3.2 Price and advertising equilibrium
Let us now endogenise the degree of information in the market by allowing
rms to advertise their products. We continue to denote by C (a; k) the cost
of reaching a fraction a of the population, where Ca > 0 and Caa > 0.22 We
also assume that k is a shift parameter that increases advertising costs and
marginal advertising costs, i.e., Ck > 0; Cak > 0. The net prot of rm i is
then given by
i = Vi   C (ai; k) : (45)
Following GS, we assume that the rms choose prices and advertising
simultaneously and independently. Thus, each rm i chooses ai and pi in
order to maximise prots taking the rivals decision as given. Since @i=@pi =
@Vi=@pi, prot-maximising prices are dened by the rst-order conditions in
(38), whereas prot-maximising advertising levels are given by the set of
rst-order condition23
22For details about the underlying advertising technology, see Grossman and Shapiro
(1984). Here, we simply adopt their cost function.
23The second-order conditions require that @
2i
@p2i
< 0; @
2i
@a2i
=  Caa < 0, and @2i@p2i
@2i
@a2i
 
@2i
@ai@pi
@2i
@pi@ai
> 0. Since @
2i
@ai@pi
= 0, the third condition is fullled by the previous two.
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@i
@ai
= (pi   c) [(1  aj)  xi + aj  yi]  Ca (ai; k) = 0; i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i:
(46)
The symmetric price-advertising equilibrium fp (k) ; a (k)g is then im-
plicitly dened by the two following equations:
Zp := (1  a)

x+ (p   c) @x
@p

+ a

y + (p   c) @y
@pi

= 0; (47)
Za := (p  c) [(1  a)  x+ a  y]  Ca (a; k) = 0: (48)
Using the implicit-function rule, we can analyse the relationship between
equilibrium price and advertising
@a
@p
=  Z
a
p
Zaa
=
 a (p   c) @y
@pj
(p   c) (y   x)  Caa > 0,
@y
@pj
> 0
@p
@a
=  Z
p
a
Zpp
=

x+ (p   c) @x
@p

 

y + (p   c) @y
@pi

8<: (1  a
)
h
2@x
@p
+ (p   c) @2x
@p2
i
+a
h
2 @y
@pi
+ @y
@pj
+ (p   c) d
dp

@y
@pi
i 9=;
? 0, Zpa ? 0
If (and only if) products are substitutes, then higher prices unambigu-
ously fuel advertising competition. The impact of advertising on price com-
petition depends again on the constellation of elasticities in the two segments.
Recalling that we can rewrite Zpa =
1
aj

xi + (pi   c) @xi@pi

, it follows from our
previous argument that Zpa > (<) 0 if (and only if) the monopolistic segment
is more (less) price elastic than the competitive segment. Hence, for a sym-
metric equilibrium it is then true that advertising sties price competition if
and only if the monopolistic market segment exhibits a higher price elastic-
ity of demand. Interestingly, this is true irrespective of whether prices are
strategic complements or substitutes.
The impact of advertising cost
Denoting the Jacobian for the system (47) and (48) by J = ZppZ
a
a  
26
ZpaZ
a
p > 0; we can now examine the impact of the costliness of advertising
on the equilibrium24
da
dk
=
 ZPp Zak
J
< 0;
dp
dk
=
ZpaZ
a
k
J
=
@p
@a
da
dk
? 0, Zpa ? 0:
While a higher advertising cost always sties advertising competition, the
e¤ect on price competition is now ambiguous. In contrast to GS, more costly
advertising may well lead to a stiing of price competition if the monopolistic
segment is more price elastic than the competitive segment. Note that this
result is in line with our previous ndings. If the monopolistic segment is
relatively price elastic, then higher levels of both own and rivals informative
advertising tend to boost prices. In this case, increases in advertising cost
lower both equilibrium advertising and equilibrium price.
Consider now the e¤ect of k on rm is prot. Totally di¤erentiating i
and observing the envelope theorem (di
dai
= di
dpi
= 0) as well as symmetry
(@a

i
@k
=
@aj
@k
= da
dk
and @p

i
@k
=
@pj
@k
= dp
dk
) we obtain
di
dk
=  Ck (a; k) + (p   c)
24 +@Di
@pj
dp
dk
+
 
@Di
@aj
 
da
dk
35
=  Ck (a; k) + (p   c)
24@p
@a
+
@Di
@pj
+
 
@Di
@aj
35  da
dk
As in GS, a higher advertising cost has, a direct and a strategic e¤ect. A
higher k (i) raises cost directly (provided Ck (a; k) > 0, which is true in
general); (ii) increases own demand, as the rival engages in less advertising25;
24It is easy to nd conditions such that J > 0: For instance, J > 0 if price elasticities
between the monopolistic and competitive segment do not vary much such that Zpa is
small. Another case is a situation, where the advertising intensity a is low, implying that
Zap is small. In section 2.2 we have considered one case, where J > 0 is satised.
25Recall that for a given price x  y is always true.
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and (iii) increases own demand if and only if it raises the rivals price. The
latter e¤ect is true in GS, but not necessarily in our model. In GS, dp
dk
> 0
due to the pro-competitive e¤ect of advertising. More generally, however, the
sign of dp
dk
depends on the relative price elasticities in the competitive and
monopoly segments. If dp
dk
< 0, then the e¤ect of advertising cost on prot is
ambiguous. For instance, if the level of demand in the competitive segment
is close to the level of demand in the monopolistic segment, i.e. if y ! x,
then
 
@Di
@aj
= y   x ! 0. In this case, the e¤ect through price dominates,
leading to an unambiguous reduction in gross (operating) prot and, for the
corresponding increase in advertising cost, to a reduction in overall prot.
Indeed, this was the case for the Hotelling-model with price elastic demand,
as illustrated in section 2.2.26
We can summarise our general results as follows.
Proposition 9 Consider a symmetric price-advertising equilibrium.
(i) A higher advertising cost (k) always induces lower levels of advertising
and induces a higher (lower) price if and only if the monopolistic segment is
less (more) price elastic than the competitive segment.
(ii) A higher advertising cost (k) leads to a higher operating prot if the
monopolistic segment is less price elastic than the competitive segment. Oth-
erwise the e¤ect on operating prot is indeterminate, as is the e¤ect on overall
prot.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have revisited the seminal work by Grossman and Shapiro
(1984) in order to check the robustness of the pro-competitive e¤ect of in-
formative advertising. By using a Hotelling duopoly version, as presented in
Tirole (1988), we have shown that the results are reversed once we allow for
a price elastic monopoly demand segment, i.e., partially informed consumers
26In the duopoly version of GS, we have that Ck (a; k) = (p  c)
+
@Di
@pj
+
dp
dk implying
di
dk =
(p  c)
 
@Di
@aj
 
da
dk > 0: Obviously, this is not neccessarily true in a more general model.
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trade-o¤ prices against travelling costs. In this case, informative advertising
in fact induces higher rather than lower prices. As demand also increases,
rmsbenet from informative advertising, and advertising restrictions will
be harmful for rms. The intuition behind this result is that partially in-
formed consumers have on average a lower willingness to pay due to higher
travelling (or mismatch) costs than fully informed consumers, and hence are
more responsive to prices. We then generalize the model by allowing for
general demand and cost functions, and derive exact conditions for infor-
mative advertising to be pro-competitive, as claimed in previous studies. A
key result here is that if prices are strategic complements, then informative
advertising will reduce (increase) prices if demand in the monopoly segment
is less (more) price elastic than demand in the competitive segment.
By way of conclusion we would like to point out some issues for fur-
ther research. First, there should be scope for further generalization of the
model. For instance, one could allow for non-uniform distributions of con-
sumers and/or targeted (non-random) advertising. Our focus was on the
price inelasticity assumption in the previous models, so we have generalized
the model along that direction. Second, there should be great scope for em-
pirical testing, as the predictions in terms of prices and prots go in opposite
directions. We leave these issues for future research.
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Taking the partial derivatives of (7)-(10), we
obtain
@pAi
@ai
=   2t
3a2i
< 0,
@pAi
@aj
=   4t
3a2j
< 0;
@bxA
@a1
=   1
3a21
< 0;
@bxA
@a2
=
1
3a22
> 0;
@DAi
@ai
=
4  3aj
6
> 0;
@DAi
@aj
=
2  3ai
6
;
@V Ai
@ai
= t
(4ai   2aj   3aiaj) (4ai + 2aj   3aiaj)
18a2i aj
;
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@V Ai
@aj
= t
( 4ai + 2aj   3aiaj) (4ai + 2aj   3aiaj)
18aia2j
:
All signs follow by inspection, except for @V Ai =@aj. Applying equilibrium
condition (12), it is readily veried that ( 4ai + 2aj   3aiaj) < 0, which
implies that @V Ai =@aj < 0 is true.
Proof of Proposition 3: Taking the partial derivatives of (14)-(18), we
obtain:
@pBi
@ai
=
2aj (4  aj) (2t  v)
(16  8ai   8aj + 3aiaj)2
;
@pBi
@aj
=
4 (4  ai) (2  ai) (2t  v)
(16  8ai   8aj + 3aiaj)2
;
@bxB
@a1
=
(2t  v) (4  3a2) (4  a2)
t (16  8a1   8a2 + 3a1a2)2
;
@bxB
@a2
=   (2t  v) (4  3a1) (4  a1)
t (16  8a1   8a2 + 3a1a2)2
;
@exBi
@ai
=  t 1@p
B
i
@ai
;
@exBi
@aj
=  t 1@p
B
i
@aj
;
@DBi
@ai
=

2  aj
2t

pBi + ai
@pBi
@ai

;
@DBi
@aj
=  ai
2t

pBi   (2  aj)
@pBi
@aj

;
@V Bi
@ai
= pBi

2  aj
2t

pBi + 2ai
@pBi
@ai

;
@V Bi
@aj
= pBi
ai
2t

2 (2  aj) @p
B
i
@aj
  pBi

:
Observing the equilibrium condition (19), i.e., v < 2t, all signs follow by
inspection, except for @V Bi =@aj and @D
B
i =@aj. Noting that sgn@V
B
i =@aj =
sgn
 with 
 := 2 (2  aj) @V Bi =@aj   pBi we can verify 
 < 0 by writing
expressly

 = f8 (2  aj) (2  ai) (4  ai) (2t  v)   [2v (4  2ai   3aj + aiaj) + taj (4  ai)]g 2
= f 2v [(8  3ai   3aj + aiaj)  + (4  ai) aiaj] + t (4  ai) [(4  aj)  + aiaj]g 2;
with := 16 8ai 8aj+3aiaj: From condition (21) it follows that 2v (8  3ai   3aj + aiaj) 
t (4  ai) (4  aj) implying that 
    (4  ai) aiaj (2v   t)  2 < 0; where
the second inequality is veried again from (21). But then @V Bi =@aj < 0:
If we write demand for product 1 as
DB1 = a1 (1  a2) exB1 + a1a2bxB;
30
and di¤erentiate with respect to a2, we get
@DB1
@a2
=  a1
 exB1   bxB+ a1 (1  a2) @exB1@a2 + a1a2@bx
B
@a2
:
Since existence of competitive segment implies that exB1 > bxB and since
@exB1 =@a2 =  t 1@pB1 =@a2 < 0 and @bxB1 =@a2 < 0 it follows that @DB1 =@a2 < 0.
In the same way, it can be proven that @DB2 =@a1 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6: By performing comparative statics on the
system (29) and (30), using the Cramers rule and the Jacobian JD = ZppZ
a
a 
ZpaZ
a
p =
2p[2v(4 5a+2a2) ta(4 a)]
a(4 3a) > 0, we obtain the following results:
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dpD
dv
=  Z
p
vZ
a
a   ZpaZav
JD
=
4p2 (1  a)
aJD
> 0;
dpD
dt
=  Z
p
t Z
a
a   ZpaZat
JD
=
2p2 [(2  a) v   at]
t (4  3a) JD > 0;
dpD
dk
=  Z
p
kZ
a
a   ZpaZak
JD
=  4ta (2t  v)
(4  3a) JD < 0;
daD
dv
=  Z
p
pZ
a
v   ZpvZap
JD
=
4p (2  a) (1  a)
JD
> 0;
daD
dt
=  Z
p
pZ
a
t   Zpt Zap
JD
=
p (2  a) [2 (1  a) v   at]
tJD
? 0;
daD
dk
=  Z
p
pZ
a
k   ZpkZap
JD
=  2ta (4  3a)
JD
< 0:
Applying the equilibrium condition in (33), i.e., v 2

t(4 a)
2(2 a) ; 2t

; all signs
follow by inspection. Total di¤erentiation of (35), yields the following results:
dD
dv
=
pD
2t
 
1  aD pD daD
dv
+ aD
 
2  aD dpD
dv

> 0;
dD
dt
=
pD
2t
"
 aD  2  aD pD
2t
+
 
1  aD pD daD
dt
+ aD
 
2  aD dpD
dt
#
< 0, da
D
dt
< 0;
dD
dk
=
pD
2t
 
1  aD pD daD
dk
+ aD
 
2  aD dpD
dk

< 0:
27It is readily veried that the equilibrium condition (33), i.e. v  t(4 a)2(2 a) implies JD > 0:
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Using the comparative statics results above, the sign of the rst and third
derivatives are immediate. Noting that
 aD  2  aD pD
2t
+ aD
 
2  aD dpD
dt
=
aD
 
2  aD
2t

2t
dpD
dt
  pD

=
   2  aD  pD2 [2 (1  a) v   at]
tJD
= pD
daD
dt
it follows that d
D
dt
=
(2 aD)(pD)2
2t
daD
dt
; implying that sgnd
D
dt
= da
D
dt
:
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